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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY?
THE THIRD CIRCUIT'S APPROACH TO 42 U.S.C. § 1983
MALICIOUS PROSECUTION CLAIMS
I.

INTRODUCTION

The common law tort of malicious prosecution affords an individual
relief where an official, acting under color of state law, abuses his or her
discretion. 1 Essentially, malicious prosecution grants an individual relief
where an officer of the state instigates a prosecution without probable
cause. 2 Similar to the tort of malicious prosecution, the Civil Rights Act of
1981 ("§ 1983") also provides relief for the misuse of state authority, provided such abuse amounts to a violation of an individual's constitutional
rights. 4 The question then becomes does an individual with a cause of
action for malicious prosecution also have a cause of action under § 1983,
1. See, e.g., Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1988) (listing common
law elements for tort of malicious prosecution); Usher v. City of Los Angeles, 828
F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir. 1987) (enumerating elements of malicious prosecution).
See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 669 (1977) (defining malicious

prosecution).
To establish a claim for malicious prosecution, generally there must be "mal-

ice in fact." See W.

PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw OF

TORTS § 119, 883 (5th ed. 1984) (explaining common law requirement of "malice
in fact"). "Malice in fact" is usually present where an official has initiated legal
proceedings for a reason other than to render justice. See id. In contrast to a
probable cause determination, the jury decides whether "malice in fact" exists. See
id. To establish "malice in fact," some courts require more than an absence of
probable cause, while other courts see the absence of probable cause as establishing a presumption of malice. See id. Finally, a minority of courts adhere to the
"English Rule" that, in addition, special damages must be shown. See id.
2. See Note, Groundless Litigation and the MaliciousProsecutionDebate: A Historical Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 1218, 1219 (1979) (discussing when individual has cause
of action for malicious prosecution).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) (codifying Civil Rights Act of 1981). The text of
§ 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress. For the purposes of this section, any Act
of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
Id.
4. See id. (providing relief if misuse of state authority is violation of constitutional rights). Specifically, § 1983 provides redress for misuses of state power that
violate a person's constitutional rights, privileges, or other immunities secured by
the Constitution. See id. For a further discussion of the meaning of § 1983, see
infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.

(919)
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and if so, which particular portion of the United States Constitution does
malicious prosecution protect?5 In Albright v. Oliver,6 the Supreme Court
of the United States considered these questions. 7 Although the Court attempted to provide lower courts with answers to these and other questions
surrounding § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, most lower courts agree
with the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which
stated that "Albright [merely] muddied the waters rather than clarified
them."8

In an attempt to "clarify" these waters, this Casebrief analyzes the constitutional requirements and prohibitions surrounding § 1983 claims for
malicious prosecution. 9 Part II begins by recounting the state of affairs in
the United States Courts of Appeals prior to the Supreme Court's decision
in Albright.10 Part II then discusses the Albright opinion and re-evaluates
the lower courts' views on this issue as a result of that opinion."1 Next,
part III focuses specifically on the Third Circuit's approach to § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, both before and after Albright. 12 Finally, part IV
suggests that there may be a possible split within the Third Circuit on this
issue.

13

II.

BACKGROUND

Congress enacted § 1983 to provide citizens with a legal remedy for
violations of certain constitutional rights. 14 Specifically, the statute affords
5. See Eric J. Wunsch, Note, Fourth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment-Malicious Prosecution and § 1983: Is There a ConstitutionalViolation Remediable
Under Section 1983?, Albright v. Oliver, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGy 878, 879

(1994) (describing diversity of opinion as to whether malicious prosecution is actionable under § 1983). For a further discussion of the actionability of § 1983
claims for malicious prosecution, see infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
6. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).

7. See id. at 268-71 (finding substantive due process could not afford petitioner relief under § 1983 malicious prosecution claim where other more explicit
text of constitution provided protection). For a further discussion of the Court's
decision in Albright, see infra notes 46-82 and accompanying text.
8. Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 n.5 (10th Cir. 1996).
9. For a further discussion of the constitutional requirements surrounding
§ 1983 claims, see infra notes 13-148 and accompanying text.
10. For a further discussion of the different lower court opinions, see infra
notes 21-44 and accompanying text.
11. For a further discussion of the decision in Albright, see infra notes 45-79
and accompanying text. For a further discussion of the lower courts' opinions
after Albright, see infra notes 80-92 and accompanying text.
12. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's view of § 1983 malicious
prosecution actions, see infra notes 93-141 and accompanying text.
13. For a further discussion of the possible split within the Third Circuit, see
infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
14. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979) (finding § 1983 provides constitutional cause of action). Section 1983 does not confer federal rights,
but rather establishes a cause of action when other constitutional liberties have
been infringed. See id. (stating § 1983 "is not itself a source of substantive rights,
but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred").
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a person a civil action where an official, acting under "color of law," deprives a person of his or her constitutional rights, privileges and immunities. 15 To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must allege a violation
of a specific constitutional provision. 1 6 Thus, one of the controversies surrounding § 1983 is whether all common law torts recognizing liability for
abuse of discretion are actionable under the statute. 17 With respect to the
common law tort of malicious prosecution, the debate has been especially
18
acute.
Prior to the Supreme Court's Albright decision, some courts took the
view that simply alleging the common law elements of the tort of malicious
prosecution was sufficient to establish a well-pleaded complaint under
§ 1983.19 To justify this view, these courts inferred that the Fourteenth
Amendment required that states determine the issue of probable cause

15. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172 (1961) (finding parties entitled to
relief where officer abuses position). Courts have interpreted the phrase "under
color of law" to be synonymous with the phrase "state action" as required by the
Fourteenth Amendment. See United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966)
("In cases under § 1983, 'under color' of law has consistently been treated as the
same thing as the 'state action' required under the Fourteenth Amendment.").
Section 1983 comes into play where a violation of federal rights can be "fairly
attributable to the State." Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937
(1982) (explaining implications of infringement of federal rights). As a result, an
official is said to act "under color of law" if he or she has state authority and proceeds to use such authority. See Roberts v. Acres, 495 F.2d 57, 59 (7th Cir. 1974)
(stating individual acts "under color of law" if "clothed with the authority of the

state and purporting to act thereunder").
16. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (explaining requirement
under § 1983 that plaintiff "identify[ ] the specific constitutional right allegedly
infringed").
17. See Wunsch, supra note 5, at 879 (stating "the courts have not held that
every common-law tort committed by an individual acting 'under color of law' is
actionable under § 1983"); see also Martin A. Schwartz, Section 1983 Litigation, 11
TouRo L. REv. 299, 301 (1995) (finding circuit courts have struggled with issue of
whether claims for malicious prosecution may be asserted under § 1983); KristinJ.
Brandon, Note, Taking the Tort Out of ConstitutionalLaw: The "ConstitutionalTort" of
Malicious"Prosecution, Albright v. Oliver, 63 U. CIN. L. REv. 1447, 1460 (1987)
("Prior to Albright, the lower courts of appeals had split regarding malicious prosecution and the manner in which it could rise to the level'of a constitutional tort.").
18. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992), affid, 510
U.S. 266 (1994) (stating that for claims alleging malicious prosecution there has
been "embarrassing diversity of judicial opinion" regarding whether such claims
are actionable under § 1983); Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1180 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1991) (finding that First, Fifth and Sixth Circuits "seem also to have flipflopped on the constitutional tort status of malicious prosecution"); see also
Wunsch, supra note 5, at 880 (asserting that "courts have differed on whether a

well-pleaded complaint based upon malicious prosecution by a govemment official
'acting under color of law' provides a cause of action under § 1983.").

19. See Colleen R. Courtade, Annotation, Actionability of Malicious Prosecution
Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, 79 A.L.R. FED. 896, 901-02 (1986) ("Some courts ...have

conclud[ed] that a mere allegation of malicious prosecution is sufficient to state a
claim under § 1983. However, most courts.., have held that the tort of malicious
prosecution, standing alone, does not implicate constitutionally protected rights,
and thus is not actionable under § 1983.").
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prior to prosecution. 20 Thus, because one of the elements of a claim for
malicious prosecution is that the proceeding must have been initiated absent probable cause, simply pleading the common law elements for the
tort of malicious prosecution appeared to satisfy the § 1983 requirement
that the complaint allege a violation of a specific constitutional
21
provision.
Other courts, however, chose not to take such an expansive reading
of the statute. 22 . These courts held that a claim for malicious prosecution
20. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 292 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding that common
law elements of malicious prosecution satisfy § 1983 claim). Essentially, Justice Stevens argued that initiation of an action without probable cause amounts to a violation of a person's due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. See id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (finding Due Process Clause protects against baseless prosecution). To support his due process probable cause requirement, Justice Stevens
looked to the Court's decision in Hurtado v. California. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to prior Supreme Court decision) (citing Hurtado v. California, 110
U.S. 516 (1884)). There, the Court held that California was not required to proceed by way of grand jury indictment in initiating a prosecution, but only because
the state had adequate safeguards to ensure that no prosecution would be instituted without first making a proper probable cause determination. See Hurtado,
110 U.S. at 538. Therefore, Hurtado appears to have held that states must make a
probable cause determination before initiating a prosecution or else be in violation of a person's due process rights. See id. Thus, if the essence of a malicious
prosecution action is the initiation of prosecution without probable cause, then
such elements in and of themselves should implicate a violation of one's Fourteenth Amendment rights. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 295 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(finding commencement of criminal action without probable cause quintessential
type of due process violation).
In addition, Justice Stevens believed that the Fifth Amendment provided Albright protection from the federal government accusing a citizen of an infamous
crime. See id. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting Fourth Amendment as
proper grounds upon which to base plaintiff's claim). The Fifth Amendment
states: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger...." See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Under the Fifth Amendment, the government, by way of a grand jury, must first make a finding of probable cause before it may accuse a person of an infamous crime. See Albright, 510
U.S. at 291 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Thus, because there was not a sufficient finding of probable cause in Albright's case, Justice Stevens found the plaintiff's Fifth
Amendment rights were violated. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
21. For a further discussion of why some courts view malicious prosecution
actions as violating the Constitution, see supra note 20 and accompanying text.
22. SeeJohn T. Ryan, Jr., Note, MaliciousProsecution Claims Under Section 1983:
Do Citizens Have FederalRecourse?, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 776, 790 (1996) (recognizing that some courts "have adopted narrower views of malicious prosecution,"
meaning more than common law elements must be alleged under § 1983); see also
Wunsch, supra note 5, at 881 (recognizing that "[o]ther circuit courts of appeals,
however, have held that an allegation of common law malicious prosecution does
not violate a provision of the Constitution unless it is 'intended to subject a person
to denial of constitutional rights'" (quoting Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1031
(9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)). For a further discussion of courts that view § 1983 as
requiring more than the common law elements of the tort of malicious prosecution, see infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
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alone does not implicate constitutionally protected rights. 23 Instead,
these courts required that a plaintiff allege not only the common law elements for malicious prosecution, but also a violation of his or her rights
that reaches constitutional magnitude. 24 The controversy thus arises
among these courts over which provision or provisions of the Constitution
25
will support a § 1983 malicious prosecution action.
A.

Courts Taking the View That the Common Law Elements for Malicious
ProsecutionSatisfy a § 1983 Claim

The elements for the common law tort of malicious prosecution are:
(1) the defendant initiated a criminal proceeding against the plaintiff absent probable cause; (2) the proceeding was resolved in the plaintiffs
favor; and (3) the defendant acted with malice in bringing the proceeding.2 6 Courts taking the expansive approach view allegation of the elements for the tort of malicious prosecution as sufficient for a cause of
action under § 1983.27 The United States Courts of Appeals for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have taken this
28
approach.
23. See, e.g., Gunderson v. Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating malicious prosecution actionable under § 1983 "only if defendants' conduct
also infringes some provision of the Constitution or federal law").
24. See Ryan, supranote 22, at 790 (explaining that some courts have required
plaintiff to allege specific violation of constitutional provision in addition to common law elements); see also Schwartz, supra note 17, at 301 (1995) (stating that
some circuit courts have "ruled that malicious prosecution may be litigated under
section 1983 only when the contested conduct is sufficiently egregious, whatever
that may be"). For a further discussion of courts that take the narrow view of
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claims, see infra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
25. See Wunsch, supra note 5, at 880 ("The debate [among circuit courts] entails not only whether malicious prosecution itself violates the federal Constitution,
but also what particular provision the tort violates."). For a further discussion of
the debate among courts over which constitutional provisions provide a remedy,
see infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
26. For a further discussion of the common law tort of malicious prosecution,
see supra note 1 and accompanying text.
27. See Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 270 n.4 (1994) (referring to lower
court opinions that see "elements of a malicious prosecution action under § 1983
[as the] same as the common-law tort of malicious prosecution"), afg 975 F.2d
343 (7th Cir. 1992).
28. See Brummett v. Camble, 946 F.2d 1178, 1180 n.2 (5th Cir. 1991) ("Our
most recent cases have assumed that malicious prosecution violates § 1983.");
NAACP v. Hunt, 891 F.2d 1555, 1563 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that "[t]here is a
federal right to be free from malicious prosecutions") (citing Strength v. Hubert, 854
F.2d 421, 425 (11th Cir. 1988) as citing Shaw v. Garrison, 467 F.2d 113, 120 (5th
Cir. 1972)); Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 163 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding constitutional action under § 1983 is met where common law elements of malicious prosecution are met); White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 961 n.5 (2d Cir. 1988) ("There can
be no question that malicious prosecution can form the basis for imposition of
liability under § 1983."); Lee v. Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1984) (stating
that "the elements of liability for the constitutional tort of malicious prosecution
under § 1983 coincide with those of the common law tort"); Losch v. Borough of
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For example, in Brummett v. Camble,29 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff had established a cause
of action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 where he had been prosecuted under an inapplicable Texas statute for his unwillingness to make
good on a bank loan. 30 The court found that where a plaintiff claims
initiation of an allegedly baseless cause of action that ends in his or her
favor, such plaintiff potentially has relief under § 1983.31
Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1984) ("It is clear that the filing of charges
without probable cause and for reasons of personal animosity is [alone] actionable
under § 1983."); Morrison v.Jones, 551 F.2d 939, 940 (4th Cir. 1977) (stating allegation of constitutional violation is not required); Inada v. Sullivan, 523 F.2d 485,
487-88 (7th Cir. 1975) (explaining that allegation of elements of malicious prosecution is sufficient for § 1983 claim).
29. 946 F.2d 1178 (5th Cir. 1991).
30. See id. at 1179. Brummett had borrowed $33,445.80 from a bank in Texas,
secured by equipment and inventory from his stereo shop. See id. Later, Brummett ran into financial trouble and was unable to meet his loan payments. Id.
When the bank tried to collect the equipment Brummett had used as collateral for
the loan, Brummett "informed them that it had been sold to customers in the
normal course of business." Id. The bank, after failing to. get Brummett's signature on a new note, filed charges against Brummet under Texas law. See id. (stating "Brummett received a letter from then County Attorney Dan Boulware,
advising Brummett that he was subjected to indictment for 'removing' the collateral that secured his debt to FSB [First State Bank of Cleburne Texas]-a felony
violation of TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.33"). The charges, however, were later dismissed due to insufficient evidence. See id. at 1180 (dismissing charges approximately three years later). Thereafter, Brummett brought an action against the
prosecutors Boulware and Maclean, the county, the loan officer, the bank, the
district and county attorneys and the president of the bank for malicious prosecution under § 1983, alleging that the district and county attorneys and both major
stockholders of the bank had conspired with the bank to persuade the jury to
convict Brummett, even though Brummett contended that he had not violated the
law. See id. (contending no violation of law because Texas law requires collateral
be transferred out of state and that prosecution was thus in bad faith). The district
court eventually dismissed the charges against the public defendants, but upheld
the action with respect to the private defendants. See id. (dismissing charges
against public defendants on theory of qualified immunity). Ultimately, however,
the district court also dismissed the charges against the private defendants because
the court held that the statute of limitations had run on Brummett's malicious
prosecution claim. See id. The Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of charges against
the public defendants, but remanded the case to the district court with respect to
the private defendants because it held that Brummett's malicious prosecution
claim had been timely. See id. at 1184 (finding statute of limitations in malicious
prosecution action does not accrue until underlying criminal proceeding has terminated in plaintiffs favor). State law determines the statute of limitations for
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claims; however, federal law determines when the
cause of action accrues. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-86
(1980) (finding that federal, not state law, governs accrual of § 1983 malicious
prosecution claims).
31. See Brummett, 946 F.2d at 1181 n.2 ("Our most recent cases have assumed
that malicious prosecution violates § 1983."); see also Thomas v. Kipperman, 846
F.2d 1009, 1011 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding common law elements of malicious prosecution as satisfying cause of action under § 1983); Hand v. Gary, 838 F.2d 1420,
1426 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that § 1983 claim is appropriately based on tort of
malicious prosecution ); Wheeler v. Cosden Oil & Chem. Co., 734 F.2d 254, 257-60
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Likewise, in White v. Frank3 2 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit held that the common law elements of malicious prosecution establish a claim under § 1983. 3 3 The plaintiff in White brought a
§ 1983 malicious prosecution action, alleging that two police officers had
perjured testimony to a grand jury, at a pretrial hearing and at the actual
trial. 3 4 With respect to whether § 1983 could afford a plaintiff relief in a
cause of action for malicious prosecution, the court stated that "[t]here
can be no question [but] that malicious prosecution can form the basis for
imposition of liability under section 1983."35 Thus, these decisions show
that prior to Albright, several circuit courts had concluded that the common law action for malicious prosecution satisfied the requirements for a
36
§ 1983 claim.

B.

Courts Taking the View That PlaintiffMust Allege a Violation of
ConstitutionalMagnitude to Establish a § 1983 Claim

Other circuit courts, however, have taken the view that to establish a
cause of action under § 1983 for malicious prosecution, the complaint
must assert a deprivation of a federally guaranteed right in addition to the
common law elements of the tort.3 7 The United States Courts of Appeals
(5th Cir. 1984) (holding that malicious prosecution is sufficient basis for § 1983
claim).
In the past, however, the Fifth Circuit had ruled that malicious prosecution
was not actionable under § 1983. See Cook v. Houston Post, 616 F.2d 791, 794 (5th
Cir. 1980) (finding torts abusing process were not actionable under § 1983); Beker
Phosphate Corp. v. Muirhead, 581 F.2d 1187, 1189 (5th Cir. 1978) ("[T]he common law tort of misuse of legal procedure, without more, does not rise to the level
of Constitutional wrong remedied by Section 1983."); Curry v. Ragan, 257 F.2d
449, 450 (5th Cir. 1958) ("Neither the 14th Amendment nor the Civil Rights Act
purport to secure a person against unfounded or even malicious claims or suits in
state courts, especially so when the laws and courts of the state are available and
furnish adequate remedies to a person aggrieved.").
The Fifth Circuit, however, explained that its present view stemmed from the
fact that an implied constitutional right exists to be free of prosecution absent
probable cause. See Wheeler, 734 F.2d at 256 (finding that Constitution protects
against charges brought only upon probable cause).
32. 855 F.2d 956 (2d Cir. 1988).
33. See id. at 961 n.5 (stating "[tlhere can be no question that malicious prosecution can form the basis for imposition of liability under Section 1983"); see also
Raysor v. Port Auth., 768 F.2d 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding common law elements
satisfy § 1983 claim); Russo v. New York, 672 F.2d 1014, 1018 (2d Cir. 1982)
(same), modified on other grounds, 721 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1983); Singleton v. City of
New York, 632 F.2d 185, 195 (2d Cir. 1980) (same).
34. See White, 855 F.2d at 957 (discussing plaintiffs allegations). The court
held that as a result of such official abuse of discretion, the plaintiff had been
improperly incarcerated for nearly two years. See id.
35. Id. at 961 n.5.
36. For a further discussion of the courts following this view, see supra notes
26-35 and accompanying text.
37. See Courtade, supra note 19, at 902 (finding that most courts require plaintiff to allege violation of constitutional rights in addition to common law elements
of malicious prosecution to constitute cause of action under § 1983); see also
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for the First, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits have taken
38
this view.
To illustrate, in Coogan v. City of Wixom, 39 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that a plaintiff bringing a § 1983 claim
for malicious prosecution must allege, in addition to the common law elements of malicious prosecution, a violation of his or her constitutional
rights. 4 0 The plaintiff had previously been convicted for arson based upon

two officers' determinations that sufficient evidence existed to establish
probable cause for the crime. 41 The charges, however, were dismissed
due to the court's inability to render a speedy trial. 42 Upon dismissal, the
plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution, but the court
dismissed the plaintiffs action due to the inability to show a lack of probable cause with respect to the proceedings for arson. 43 Nevertheless, the
Schwartz, supra note 17, at 301 (comparing Second and Third Circuits with First
and Sixth Circuits and stating that latter allow litigation under § 1983 for malicious
prosecution only when "defendant acted with an intent to violate the plaintiffs
constitutionally protected rights"); Brandon, supra note 17, at 1461 (finding that
other circuit courts have commanded that plaintiff establish violation of Constitution in addition to common law elements of tort of malicious prosecution).
38. See Kohl v. Casson, 5 F.3d 1141, 1145 (8th Cir. 1993) ("[M]alicious prosecution, without more, does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983"); Albright v.
Oliver, 975 F.2d 343, 345 (7th Cir. 1992) (classifying decision as requiring more
than common law elements of tort for malicious prosecution); Gunderson v.
Schlueter, 904 F.2d 407, 409 (8th Cir. 1990) ("[M]alicious prosecution by itself is
not punishable under Section 1983 because it does not allege a constitutional injury."); Morales v. Ramirez, 906 F.2d 784, 790 (1st Cir. 1990) (finding that abuse of
official's authority must reach level of constitutional magnitude to establish claim
under § 1983); Torres v. Superintendent of Police, 893 F.2d 404, 409 (1st Cir.

1990) ("We agree with the majority rule that the defendant must subject the plaintiff to a deprivation of constitutional magnitude in order to state a claim under
section 1983."); Usher v. Los Angeles, 828 F.2d 556, 561-62 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that claim for malicious prosecution may be had under § 1983 where state

provides no remedy and where malicious prosecution is "conducted with the intent to deprive a person of equal protection of the laws or is otherwise intended to
subject a person to a denial of constitutional rights" (citing Coogan v. City of Wixom,
820 F.2d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1987) (asserting that malicious prosecution does not
automatically constitute denial of due process); Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026,
1031 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc)); Vasquez v. Hamtramck, 757 F.2d 771, 773 (6th
Cir. 1985) (rejecting idea that common law elements of malicious prosecution satisfy § 1983 claim); Dunn v. Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121, 123 (6th Cir. 1982) (same).
39. 820 F.2d 170 (6th Cir. 1987).
40. See id. at 175 (citing Dunn, 697 F.2d at 125, as holding that "[o]nly when
'the misuse of a legal proceeding is so egregious as to subject the aggrieved individual to a deprivation of constitutional dimension' does § 1983 provide a remedy for
a claim of malicious prosecution").
41. See id. Defendant, Bruce Kirby, a Wixom police officer, determined that
the plaintiff, Edward Coogan, had intentionally set fire to the office of his real
estate business on two separate occasions. See id. at 171-72 (basing determination
on existence of irregular burn patterns and fact that Coogan had increased his fire
insurance coverage just prior to burnings).
42. See id. at 172 (articulating reason for dismissal of charges against plaintiff).
43. See id. at 173 (rejecting plaintiffs contention that officer had instigated
prosecution absent probable cause). The court stated that "[w]here there are suf-
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court indicated that in its view, a proper § 1983 action for malicious prosecution "[o ] nly [exists] 'when the misuse of a legal proceeding is so egregious as to subject the aggrieved individual to a deprivation of
constitutional dimension' . . .44 As a result of this case, it is clear that
other circuit courts have required an additional violation of constitutional
magnitude to establish a well-pleaded complaint under § 1983 for mali45
cious prosecution.
C.

The Albright v. Oliver Decision

In Albright v. Oliver,46 the plaintiff, Kevin Albright, was accused of selling a substance that resembled cocaine to a police informant. 4 7 Although
the police discovered that the substance was not cocaine, the detective on
the case still testified to a criminal information regarding the sale, and as a
result, an arrest warrant was issued for Albright's arrest.48 There was some
confusion in locating Albright and arresting him because the informant
told police that she had purchased the substance from John Albright, Jr.,
when in reality it was his son, Kevin Albright. 49 Once Kevin Albright was
found, however, he immediately surrendered to the detective and bond
was set at $350.50 Albright met his bond and was released on the condificient facts to warrant a prudent person in a defendant's position to believe that a
crime was committed and that the person charged committed it," failure to investigate further does not negate probable cause. Id. Because the officer had obtained expert assistance and done a thorough investigation, the court concluded
that there had been probable cause to arrest the plaintiff in this case. See id.
44. Id. at 175 (quoting Dunn, 697 F.2d at 125).
45. For a further discussion of courts that require a violation of constitutional
magnitude to make out a claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983, see supra
notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
46. 975 F.2d 343 (7th Cir. 1992), afg 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
47. See id. at 344 (discussing conditions of petitioner's arrest). Prior to the
filing of the criminal information, the undercover informant, Veda Moore, told
Detective Oliver that John Albright, Jr., sold her cocaine at a hotel for students in
the city of Macomb. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 268 n.1 (describing place of alleged
crime). What Moore believed to be "cocaine," however, was really baking powder.
See id.
48. See Albright, 975 F.2d at 344 (describing Oliver's testimony at criminal
information).
49. See id. (finding that when Oliver served John Albright, Jr. with arrest warrant, Oliver discovered that Albright was "retired pharmacist in his sixties," and
thus, could not be who Moore had said he was). After also ruling out the possibility of Albright's oldest son, John David Albright, Detective Oliver, upon confirmation by Moore, concluded that the sale was actually made by Kevin Albright, John
Albright, Jr.'s second son. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 268 n.1 (confirming second son
was actually one involved in illegal sale). Subsequently, a grand jury indicted Kevin
Albright on charges of selling a "look-alike" substance. See id. (explaining charges
against Kevin Albright).
50. See Albright, 975 F.2d at 344, 347 (noting, however, that upon surrender to

Detective Oliver, Albright denied his guilt of such offense). Kevin Albright did
admit, however, that he had been in Macomb the night Moore alleged that he sold
the look-alike substance. See id. at 344.
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tion that he would.,not leave the state of Illinois without court permission. 5 1 Later, the detective testified at a preliminary hearing, but never
52
mentioned that there had been complications in arresting Albright.
The action was subsequently dismissed because the charges did not
amount to an offense under Illinois law.5 3 Approximately two years after
the charges were dropped, Albright instituted a cause of action against the
detective for malicious prosecution under § 1983. 5 4 In his complaint, Albright alleged that his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment had been violated because he had a liberty interest in
55
being free from criminal prosecution absent probable cause.
Unable to find a cause of action under § 1983, however, the District
Court dismissed Albright's claim. 56 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the decision, but on different grounds. 57 Thereafter, the
51. See id. at 344 (stating defendant could not leave state without court
consent).
52. See id. (stating that Detective Oliver did not disclose that he had previously
tried to arrest Albright's father and brother at preliminary hearing).
53. See id. (noting that appellate court did not know reason behind trial
court's determination, because appellate court could not locate decision).
54. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 269 (describing cause of action against Detective
Oliver in his individual and official capacities). Albright argued that the police
had violated his substantive due process rights to be free of malicious prosecution.
See id.

55. See id. (stating that "Oliver deprived him of substantive due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment-his 'liberty interest'-to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause.").
56. See id. (granting defendant's 12(b)(6) motion on grounds that Albright's
claim did not state cause of action under § 1983). The court also found that:
Detective Oliver was entitled to a defense of qualified immunity, and that
the complaint failed to allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability against the city of Macomb. The District Court also dismissed without
prejudice the common-law claim of malicious prosecution against Detective Oliver. These issues are not before this Court.
Id. at 269 n.3.
57. See Albright, 975 F.2d at 348. The Seventh Circuit determined that peti-

tioner had filed under § 1983 because the statute of limitations had run under a
suit for false arrest. See id. at 345. The court stated that although malicious prosecution can establish part of a claim under § 1983, without incarceration, loss of
employment, or other such consequence, mere prosecution absent probable cause
could not serve as a basis under § 1983. See id. at 346-47 (holding prosecution
without some other "palpable consequence [ ]" did not constitute cause of action
under § 1983). Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit took the view that where an adequate state tort remedy existed, the plaintiff, without more, should not be able to
sue under § 1983. See id. (stating "just as in the garden-variety public-officer defamation case that does not result in exclusion from an occupation, state tort remedies should be adequate and the heavy weaponry of constitutional litigation can be
left at rest"). The court also disagreed with Albright's argument that his inability

to leave the state constituted a denial of his constitutionally protected right to
travel because, as the court reasoned, Albright's confinement was meant only to
assure that he would attend the preliminary hearing, not to ensure that Albright
would not leave Illinois. See id. Finally, the court rejected Albright's equal protection argument because he did not constitute a "class" of persons necessary for an
equal protection analysis. See id. at 348.
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Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment could serve as the basis for a § 1983
claim. 58 Although holding that the substantive Due Process Clause was
not the constitutional hook under which Albright could bring his claim,
the Court's decision did not address several controversial issues surrounding § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. 5 9 Thus, the Albright decision has
left many of the lower federal courts with unresolved questions, primarily
involving which constitutional provisions will satisfy a claim under
§ 1983.60
1. Justice Rehnquist: The Plurality Opinion
Justice Rehnquist gave the four-justice plurality opinion by clearly stating that to claim relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must identify the specific
constitutional provision he or she claims has been violated. 6 1 Because Albright had alleged a violation of his substantive due process right to be
free of prosecution absent probable cause (versus a violation of his procedural due process rights or his Fourth Amendment rights), Justice Rehnquist proceeded to analyze whether such a provision could provide the
basis for his malicious prosecution claim under § 1983.62 According to
63
Justice Rehnquist, it could not.
58. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 268 (stating "[p]etitioner asks us to recognize a
substantive right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause").
59. See, e.g., Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing Albright's failure to establish whether plaintiff in malicious prosecution suit
must allege violation of Fourth Amendment or whether procedural due process or
other explicit text of Constitution may serve as basis for § 1983 cause of action).
The court went on to note the confusion among lower courts over what constitutes
a Fourth Amendment seizure. See id. at 174. For a further discussion of the unsettied effects of Aibright, see infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
60. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 172 (referring to Albright's confusing aftermath).
For a further discussion of the variance among lower courts due to Albright, see
infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text.
61. SeeAlbright, 510 U.S. at 271 (stating "[t]he first step in any such claim is to
identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed"); see also Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (same); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140
(1979) (same).
62. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 (noting that Albright had not alleged violation of his procedural due process rights, nor violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights). Thus, the court only considered whether Albright's claim fell under a substantive due process analysis. See id. For a discussion ofJustice Ginsburg's opinion
of the possibility that Albright's claim amounted to a Fourth Amendment seizure,
see infra notes 71-81 and accompanying text.
63. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 275 (stating that "substantive due process . ..
[could] afford [petitioner] no relief"). For a further discussion of why Albright's
claim did not fall within substantive due process, see infra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
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Albright argued that the Due Process Clause protected his right to be
free from malicious prosecution absent probable cause. 6 4 Justice Rehnquist disagreed, however, stating that the rights previously deemed by the
Court to be liberty interests affording protection under the substantive
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, had generally been
found in the areas of "marriage, family, procreation and the right to bodily integrity." 65 In Justice Rehnquist's view, the liberty interest that Albright alleged was thus very distinct. 66 Because of this, and the fact that
the Court had historically been careful not to expand the category of
rights protected under the Due Process Clause, the Court declined to do
67
so here.
On the other hand, because petitioner was alleging a violation of his
pretrial liberties, and because the Framers had designed the Fourth
Amendment to cover deprivations of pretrial liberties, Justice Rehnquist
concluded that the plaintiff should have brought his claim under the
Fourth Amendment.' 8 Justice Rehnquist stated that, "[w] here a particular
Amendment 'provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection(,]'" the court should not review a claim under the general notion of
64. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 271 ("[Petitioner] claims that the action of respondents infringed his substantive due process right to be free of prosecution without
probable cause.").
65. Id. at 272; see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-49 (1992)
(discussing cases that recognized substantive due process rights).
66. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 272 ("Petitioner's claim to be free from prosecution except on the basis of probable cause is markedly different from those [previously] recognized.").
67. See id. (refusing to expand substantive due process concept "because the
guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are scarce and
open-ended"). Justice Rehnquist did, however, recognize that the Fourteenth
Amendment does confer both substantive and procedural due process rights. See
id.; see also United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987) (responding to Albright's argument that Fourteenth Amendment has substantive and procedural
due process rights designed to protect individual from arbitrary exercise of governmental power); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) (same). The court
refused, however, to concede that in every instance where government action is
alleged to be arbitrary that one's substantive and procedural due process rights are
necessarily implicated. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 272 ("[I]t does not follow that, in
all of the various aspects of a criminal prosecution, the only inquiry mandated by
the Constitution is whether, in the view of the Court, the governmental action in
question was 'arbitrary.'").
68. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 274. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Court explained that although not all of the Bill of Rights had been incorporated under the Fourteenth Amendment, many of them, such as the Fourth
Amendment, have been. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 272-73 (enumerating Bill of
Rights made applicable to states).
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substantive due process. 69 Unfortunately, because Albright had not specifically alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated, the Court
70
did not analyze whether Albright's claim would have been successful.
2. Justice Ginsburg's ConcurringOpinion: The Concept of Seizure

Justice Ginsburg agreed with the plurality opinion that Albright could
not institute a cause of action under § 1983 based on a violation of his
substantive due process rights. 7 1 Justice Ginsburg also agreed Albright
69. Albright, 510 U.S. at 273-74.
70. See id. at 275 ("We express no view as to whether petitioner's claim would
succeed under the Fourth Amendment, since he has not presented that question

in his petition for certiorari."). The court did hold, however, that petitioner's pretrial arrest fell within the Fourth Amendment concept of seizure. See id. at 271; see
also Bower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596 (1989) (finding restraint must be
intentional); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968) (finding restraint on liberty
constitutes "seizure").
As Justice Rehnquist noted, Albright probably recognized that he should have

asserted a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, however, because Albright
had probably assumed that the statute of limitations for an unlawful arrest had
run, he brought his action under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Albright, 510
U.S. at 271 n.5 (stating "Albright may have missed the statute of limitations for any
claim he had based on an unconstitutional arrest or seizure"). The court declined
to express a view as to when such claim may have run. See id. For a further discussion of the concept of "seizure," see infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text.
71. SeeAlbright, 510 U.S. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (agreeing with "plurality that Albright's claim against the police officer responsible for his arrest is
properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than under the heading
of substantive due process").

Justice Ginsburg noted that petitioner had probably declined to invoke the
Fourth Amendment because he assumed that the courts would not find him still
"seized" once released from official custody, notwithstanding the fact that he had
been required to attend a preliminary hearing. See id. at 277 (Ginsburg,J., concurring). According to Justice Ginsburg, Albright probably believed that the courts

would define the concept of seizure narrowly because of the Supreme Court's
holding in Graham v. Connor. See id. at 277 n.2 (citing Graham v. Connor,490 U.S.
386, 389 (1989) and finding substantive due process, not Fourth Amendment, applies to post-arrest pre-charge interrogation). Because such a narrow definition of
the term "seizure" would have the effect of excluding Detective Oliver's allegedly
misleading testimony given at the preliminary hearing, Albright had chosen to
pursue his claim under a substantive due process analysis. See id. at 277 (Ginsburg,

J., concurring).
Additionally, if the court determined that Albright's "seizure" ended at the
time of his arrest, then as the Court of Appeals suggested, the statute of limitations

would have accrued at that time, and consequently, the applicable statute of limitations would have run before his complaint was filed. See id. at 280 (Ginsburg, J.,

concurring) ("The Court of Appeals suggested in dictum that any Fourth Amendment claim Albright might have had accrued on the date of his arrest.. .

.").

If,

however, as Justice Ginsburg concluded, the concept of "seizure" is found to continue even upon official release from custody, the accrual date for a § 1983 action
for malicious prosecution should be upon dismissal of the criminal charges:
Once it is recognized, however, that Albright remained effectively
.seized" for trial so long as the prosecution against him remained pending, and that Oliver's testimony at the preliminary hearing, if deliberately
misleading, violated the Fourth Amendment by perpetuating the seizure,
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should have brought his claim under the Fourth Amendment. 72 Unlike
the other Justices, however, Justice Ginsburg did consider whether, for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Albright's pretrial deprivations and
73
restrictions on travel during the trial could possibly amount to a seizure.
Ultimately, Justice Ginsburg concluded that they could amount to a
seizure (i.e., that Albright would have had a valid claim under § 1983 had
he alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights); however, because
Albright had not chosen to predicate his claim under such provision, the
74
Court could not afford him a remedy.
For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Ginsburg explained
that a seizure was meant to run from the time of arrest to the time a person was released from official custody. 75 Citing support from common
law, Justice Ginsburg explained that an arrest had historically been viewed
as merely a means for securing a defendant's appearance in court. 76 Because other types of court-imposed restrictions similarly ensure an individual's court attendance, such as the requirement of bond or a restraint on
travel, Justice Ginsburg argued that these types of restraints could likewise
constitute Fourth Amendment seizures. 7 7 Thus, according to Justice Ginsburg, the only difference between pretrial incarceration and bail is that
they are simply different methods for securing a defendant's appearance
in court. 78 They were not, as Justice Ginsburg emphasized, distinctions
then the limitation period should have a different trigger. The time to
file the [section] 1983 action should begin to run not at the start, but at
the end of the episode in suit ....
Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Thus, according to justice Ginsburg, Albright could
have brought an action for violation of his Fourth Amendment rights and he
would have been within the statute of limitations. See id. (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring).

72. See id. at 280 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg agreed with the
plurality that where an Amendment explicitly protected certain rights, that provision, and not "the more generalized notion of 'substantive due process,' must be
the guide for analyzing these claims." Id. at 281 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (declining to break new ground in notion of substantive due process).
73. See id. at 276-79 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (conducting Fourth Amendment analysis).
74. See id. at 280 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (stating that Albright's Fourth
Amendment claim was not "substantively deficient," but because "Albright aban-

doned [it] in the District Court and did not attempt to reassert [it] in this Court,"
she would agree with plurality).
75. See id. at 279 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (finding that "a defendant released pretrial is ... still 'seized' in the constitutionally relevant sense").

76. See id. at 278 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("The purpose of an arrest at
common law, in both criminal and civil cases, was 'only to compel an appearance
in court,' and 'that purpose is equally answered, whether the sheriff detains [the
suspect's] person, or takes sufficient security for his appearance, called bail.'").
77. For a further discussion of why bail constitutes a seizure, see supra note 76
and accompanying text.
78. SeeAlbright, 510 U.S. at 278-79 (GtnsburgJ., concurring) (finding defendant released pre-trial, but with limitations, "scarcely at liberty"). Thus, according
to Justice Ginsburg, so long as a person's movements are restricted, no matter the
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between "seizure and its opposite." 79 Essentially, Justice Ginsburg's concept of seizure would entail any situation or form of control over a defendant that restrains his or her liberty when its effect is to ensure a
defendant's appearance in court. 80 According to Justice Ginsburg, a person may still be seized for Fourth Amendment purposes, even if they have
been released from official custody. 8 1
D.

The State of Affairs Among the Circuit Courts After Albright

Due to the Albright decision, it now appears that most courts recognize § 1983 malicious prosecution actions. 82 Some courts take the view
that malicious prosecution claims may only be brought under the Fourth
Amendment. 83 Other courts, however, have viewed Albright as limited to
where the deprivation
its facts and see a possible violation of due process
84
of liberty alleged is due to an abuse of process.
The Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have held
that an action for malicious prosecution under § 1983 can only be predi85
In concated upon a violation of a plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights.

form, the defendant remains effectively seized for Fourth Amendment purposes.
See id.

79. Albright, 510 U.S. at 278 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
80. For a further discussion of "seizure" according to Justice Ginsburg, see
supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
81. See Albright, 510 U.S. at 279 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (holding person
still facing charges, notwithstanding release from official custody, "still 'seized' in
the constitutionally relevant sense" because he is bound to appear in court for
trial).

82. See Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 181-83 (3d Cir. 1998) (Debevoise,
J., dissenting) (finding most courts of appeals recognize an action for malicious
prosecution under § 1983, however, some courts differ with respect to constitutional provision that must be allegedly violated); see also Ryan, supra note 22, at 803
("The decision reached in Albright has created confusion in the lower federal
courts. The availability of § 1983 for relief on a malicious prosecution claim
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment remains unclear.").
83. For a list of courts taking the view that § 1983 malicious prosecution
claims can only be brought under the Fourth Amendment, see infra note 85 and
accompanying text.
84. For a list of courts taking the view that § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution may be predicated upon other constitutional provisions, see infra note 86
and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Whiting v. Traylor, 85 F.3d 581, 584-86 (1lth Cir. 1996) (reading
Aibright to mean that right protected under § 1983 malicious prosecution claim is
Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures); Taylor v.
Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that malicious prosecution claims must be brought for violation of Fourth Amendment and not for violation of substantive due process); Taylor v. Waters, 81 F.3d 429, 435-37 (4th Cir.
1996) (finding that plaintiff must show deprivation consistent with concept of
.seizure"); Moore v. Hayes, No. 94-1894, 1996 WL 200282, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 24,
1996) ("To the extent that a claim of malicious prosecution is actionable under
§ 1983, the Supreme Court has held that the claim must be judged under the
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment."); Smart v. Board of
Trustees, 34 F.3d 432, 434 (7th Cir. 1994) (interpreting Abright to allow constitu-
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trast, the First, Third, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have stated that a
plaintiff may allege a violation of his or her due process rights. 86 Moreover, the Second and Fifth Circuits have fluctuated on the issue. 87 The
Second Circuit has stated that where the facts for a claim of malicious
prosecution under § 1983 fit more appropriately under the concept of
seizure, the plaintiff should only be allowed to base his or her claim upon
a violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights.8 8 The Second Circuit,
however, has attempted to avoid the issue of whether a plaintiff may still
allege a violation of due process until it encounters the proper case under
89
which to analyze the issue.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit has not come forth with a clear stance on
this issue. 90 In Blackwell v. Barton,91 the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiff
must bring an action under § 1983 in a case of mistaken identity under the
Fourth Amendment and not the Fourteenth Amendment. 9 2 In Brothers v.
Klevenhagen,93 however, the Fifth Circuit stated that with respect to an official's abuse of authority after arrest, a plaintiff should claim a violation
94
under the Due Process Clause not the Fourth Amendment.

tional malicious prosecution claims provided they allege violation of Fourth
Amendment). But see Ruehman v. Sheahan, 34 F.3d 525, 528-29 (7th Cir. 1994)
(noting that plaintiffs may pursue due process theory against defendant).
86. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 172 (finding § 1983 malicious prosecution claim can
be based upon violation of constitutional provision other than Fourth Amendment); Hall v. Gonfrade, No. 93-2368, 1994 WL 527165, at *2 (1st Cir. Sept. 29,
1994) (stating that plaintiff in malicious prosecution action under § 1983 can
claim deprivation of constitutional due process rights); Cantarella v. Kuzemchak,
No. 93-16333, 1994 WL 529530, at *2 (9th Cir. Sept. 29, 1994) (holding that § 1983
action for malicious prosecution is conceivable under due process).
87. For a further discussion of the Second and Fifth Circuit decisions, see
infra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
88. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 691 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding it "doubtful
that any plaintiff may pursue a Fifth Amendment substantive due process claim
based on the same facts as alleged in a Fourth Amendment unreasonable search
claim"). The Second Circuit went on to say that it would appear that "substantive
due process is unavailable as a restraint on conduct regulated by the Fourth
Amendment." Id.

89. See id. (finding possibility for substantive due process violation where conduct of search and seizure "shocks the conscience" of court).
90. For a further discussion of the split in the Fifth Circuit, see infra notes 9194 and accompanying text.
91. 34 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 1994).

92. See id. at 302 (requiring action under Fourth Amendment violation).
93. 28 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1994).

94. See id. at 456-57 (finding Fourteenth Amendment claim proper where official abuse of authority occurs after arrest).
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III.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Third Circuit's View Pre-Albright

Prior to the Albright decision, the Third Circuit took the most expansive approach with respect to § 1983 malicious prosecution claims. 9 5 For
example, in Lee v. Mihalich,9 6 the plaintiffs, a nursing home and its owner,
brought an action against investigators with the state Attorney General's
office, seeking damages for malicious prosecution under § 1983. 9 7 In response, the officials moved for dismissal of the action on grounds of qualified immunity. 98 The United States District Court for the Eastern District
95. See Wunsch, supranote 5, at 880 (stating that "[t]he most liberal approach
taken with respect to an allegation of malicious prosecution under § 1983 has been
clearly articulated by the Third Circuit, which held that an allegation of the elements of the common law tort, by itself, states a claim under § 1983 for violation of
a constitutional right"); see also Ryan, supra note 22, at 790 (stating that Third Circuit has adopted liberal view with respect to malicious prosecution actions under

§ 1983).
96. 847 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1988).
97. See id. at 67. The Denver Nursing Home, owned by William Lee, was a
participant in Pennsylvania's Medicaid Assistance Program, which received federal
reimbursements for certain allowable expenses. See id. at 67-68. Leonard Mihalich
and Bradford King, investigators for the Medicaid Fraud Unit, suspected that the
Denver Nursing Home might have been involved in improprieties regarding
claims for reimbursements and began an investigation into the home's operation.
See id. at 68. Following the investigation, King and Mihalich filed two 64 count
informations alleging Medicaid fraud against Lee and the Denver Nursing Home.
See id. Because the law governing the action required that criminal prosecutions
be brought within two years after the offense was committed, and because the
court determined that the last criminal act occurred on January 11, 1980 (i.e., the
date of the last report Denver Nursing Home filed) and the informations were not
filed until January 12, 1982, such informations were untimely. See id. The investigators, however, arguing under an exception that allows criminal actions to be
brought within one year of the "discovery" of the offense, where fraud is an element of the crime, asserted that if the fraud was not discovered until execution of
the search warrant in July, 1981, then the information filed on January 12, 1982,
was timely. See id. The Court of Common Pleas rejected this argument. See id.
(assuming that if investigators had had sufficient evidence to support their case
they had it "by early November of 1980," thus concluding that evidence secured in
July of 1981 via search warrant was cumulative). As a result, the charges against
Lee and the nursing home were dropped. See id. Upon dismissal of the charges
Lee and the Denver Nursing Home brought suit for malicious prosecution under
§ 1983, alleging that the prosecution was malicious because the investigators "disregarded a clear statute of limitations ban." See id.
98. See id. at 67. Government officials conducting their discretionary duties
generally are immune from civil damages for liability where their actions "do[ ]
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would ...

know[ ]." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).

Qualified immunity was created to insulate government officials from the personal
costs of litigation and the burden such litigation imposes upon government officials' ability to perform their official duties. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 646 (1987) (explaining purpose behind defense of qualified immunity).
When resolving issues of qualified immunity, the first step is to determine
"whether the plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right." County
of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998). Whether qualified immunity
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of Pennsylvania denied the investigators' motion. 9 9 The Third Circuit,
however, determined that the investigators were, in fact, entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity. 10 0 Even though appellees were not successful in their malicious prosecution action, the Third Circuit clearly
stated that a claim for malicious prosecution brought under § 1983 is
properly pleaded where the elements of liability for the common law tort
of malicious prosecution are sufficiently alleged.10 1
applies depends upon how clearly the right which the plaintiff asserts has been
established by law. See id. (referring to question whether right allegedly violated
was clearly established at time of events); Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640 (stating "contours of the right must be sufficiently clear"). The test for qualified immunity is
whether a reasonable officer would understand that what he or she has done violates the law. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641. The subjective belief of the officer is
not what is important, but whether a reasonable jury could find that the officer's
belief in the lawfulness of his or her actions was reasonable or not. See Martin v.
Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 253-54 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
99. See Lee v. Mihalich, No. CIV.A. 83-2093, 1987 WL 11905, at *3 (E.D. Pa.
June 2, 1987) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment based on defense of qualified immunity). After the district court denied defendant's motion
for summary judgment based on the defense of qualified immunity, the defendants were able to appeal the decision because an order denying such defense is a
final judgement. See Lee, 847 F.2d at 67 ("An order denying a summary judgment
motion for qualified immunity is an appealable final order."); see also Behrens v.
Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307 (1996) (finding "an order rejecting the defense of
qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summaryjudgment stage is a
'final' judgment subject to immediate appeal"), on remand to sub nom. Pelletier v.
Federal Home Loan Bank, 130 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 1997), and reh'g in part 145 F.3d
1094 (9th Cir. 1998); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985) (finding order
denying summary judgment motion for qualified immunity is appealable final decision), on remand to sub nom. Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 772 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983);
Hynson v. City of Chester, 827 F.2d 932, 933 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting parties asserting qualified immunity defense may appeal order denying summaryjudgment because denial is "final decision").
100. See Lee, 847 F.2d at 71-72 (stating that Appellants were entitled to defense
of qualified immunity). In the court's opinion, because the Pennsylvania law was
unclear regarding when the statute of limitations ran for this type of action, a
reasonable jury could conclude that the investigators did not know that their actions violated the law. See id. at 70-71 (stating "[o]n this record no reasonable jury
could find that the unlawfulness of the investigators' actions was so apparent that
their claim of qualified immunity must be denied").
101. See id. at 69-70 (stating common law elements for malicious prosecution
satisfy claim under § 1983); see also Deary v. Three Un-named Police Officers, 746
F.2d 185, 194 n.ll (3d Cir. 1984) (listing elements necessary for § 1983 action for
malicious prosecution), abrogationon other grounds, sub nom, Karnes v. Skrutski, 62
F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 1995); Losch v. Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 907 (3d Cir. 1984)
(finding that filing merely for reasons of personal animosity, without probable
cause, is actionable under § 1983); Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213, 1217 (3d
Cir. 1977) (noting that malicious prosecution occurs when there is no probable
cause and action is based on bad motive); Bell v. Brennan, 570 F. Supp. 1116, 1118
(E.D. Pa. 1983) (finding elements of liability for constitutional tort of malicious
prosecution under § 1983 coincide with those of common law tort). According to
the Third Circuit, a civil action for a § 1983 malicious prosecution requires that:
"(1) the defendant initiate a criminal proceeding; (2) which ends in plaintiff's
favor; (3) which was initiated without probable cause; and (4) the defendant acts
maliciously or for a purpose other than bringing the defendant tojustice." See Lee,
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B.

937

Post Albright Third CircuitDecisions

1. Facts of Torres v. McLaughlin
In Torres v. McLaughlin,10 2 the plaintiff, Torres, was arrested and
charged with unlawful possession of eighty-seven vials of cocaine with intent to deliveri' 0 3 As a result of his arrest, Torres was required to attend a
preliminary hearing, a pretrial hearing and to post bond. 10 4 At trial, the
arresting officer, Officer McLaughlin, was the sole witness for the government.1 0 5 Based on his testimony, the jury found Torres guilty and sentenced him to three to six years in jail and assessed a fine of $10,000.106

Seven and a half months later, Torres' attorney moved for a new trial
and the Commonwealth sought a nolle prosequi,because both believed that
10 7
McLaughlin had previously lied about a search warrant in another case.
The court granted both motions and released Torres.10 8 Upon his release
from jail, Torres brought a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against
Officer McLaughlin and his supervisor, John Sunderhauf, alleging that
McLaughlin had conveyed false information to the prosecutor that had
resulted in Torres' incarceration.10 9 Torres asserted that his First, Fourth,
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. 110 McLaughlin moved for summary judgment, claiming that he was entitled to the
defense of qualified immunity.1 1' The District Court, however, interpreting Albright, held that claims for malicious prosecution under § 1983 must
847 F.2d at 69-70 (citing elements of malicious prosecution claim under § 1983).
Actual malice is defined as "ill will in the sense of spite, lack of belief by the actor
himself in the propriety of the prosecution, or its use for an extraneous improper
purpose." Id. at 70; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 668 (1977) (defining
"actual malice" as "ill will").
102. 163 F.3d 169 (3d Cir. 1998).
103. See id. at 170
104. See id. at 171 (stating Torres appeared at preliminary hearing, was informed of charges, signed his own bond and was required to attend pre-trial hearing and trial).
105. See id.
106. See id.

107. See id. (asserting McLaughlin may have lied in application for search
warrant inanother, unrelated case). A nolle prosequi isa voluntary withdrawal by

the plaintiff in a civil action or the prosecuting attorney in a criminal suit. See
BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "nolle prosequi" as "[a]
formal entry upon the record, by the plaintiff in a civil suit, or more commonly, by
the prosecuting attorney in a criminal action by which he declares that he 'will no
further prosecute' the case, either as to some of the defendants, or altogether.");
see also Brantley v. Commonwealth, 506 A.2d 970, 973 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1986).
108. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 171 (granting attorney's and Commonwealth's motion, thus, releasing Torres).
109. See id.
110. See id.The district court, however, concluded that only a claim for a
violation of Torres' Fourth Amendment rights could survive. See id.(dismissing
Torres' claims for violations of his First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
111. See id.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999

19

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 5 [1999], Art. 5
VILLANovA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44: p. 919

be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment.1 12 Because the court determined that Torres' post-conviction incarceration amounted to a seizure
and thus, a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, it denied defendant's motion for summary judgment.11 3 Subsequently, defendants appealed this denial of their summary judgment motion based on the
14
defense of qualified immunity.
2.

The Third Circuit Holding

First, the Third Circuit held that after Albright it was clear that § 1983
claims for malicious prosecution must allege violations of constitutional
magnitude.11 5 Second, in contrast to the district court's decision, the
Third Circuit did not find that either Torres' post-conviction incarceration
amounted to a Fourth Amendment seizure or that § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution must always be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment. 1 16 Rather, the court interpreted Aibright to mean that only where
112. See id. at 172 (finding district court construed Albright "to allow only malicious prosecution claims based on violations of the Fourth Amendment").
113. See Torres v. McLaughlin, 966 F. Supp. 1353, 1364 (finding that postincarceration conviction amounts to Fourth Amendment seizure and there was
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment motion), rev'd, 163 F.2d 169 (3d

Cir. 1998). The district court, however, rejected justice Ginsburg's opinion, suggesting that even the requirement that Torres attend a preliminary hearing could
constitute a seizure. See id. On the other hand, the district court suggested that
restrictions on a person's travel or requiring the defendant to post bond could
amount to a Fourth Amendment seizure. See id. at 1360-61.
114. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 171. The Third Circuit, however, never addressed
whether the officials should have been entitled to the defense of qualified immunity because the court, in refusing to find a violation of Torres' Fourth Amendment rights (because it refused to recognize post-conviction incarceration as a
seizure), never reached the question. See id. at 174-75.
115. See id. at 172. SeniorJudge Debevoise explained that although the court
previously had only required persons asserting § 1983 malicious prosecution actions to allege its common law elements, in light of Albright it was now clear that
plaintiffs must allege a violation of a constitutional right. See id. at 180-81
(Debevoise, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 173-74 (finding post-conviction incarceration does not amount
to seizure under Fourth Amendment). The court stated that the law is clearly
established as to when a Fourth Amendment seizure begins. See id. at 174 (finding
it "beyond dispute that the Fourth Amendment has been construed to include
events both before and after a formal arrest"); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
556-60 (1979) (assuming arguendo that Fourth Amendment applies to pretrial detainees' room and body cavity searches); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114
(1974) (" [T] he Fourth Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable

cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest."); Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968) (finding Fourth Amendment applies to police conduct
that stops short of "a 'technical arrest' or 'full-blown search'"). On the other
hand, the court stated that the law was not clearly defined as to when a seizure
ends. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 174 (stating that Supreme Court had not determined
when Fourth Amendment protections no longer protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures). Because a post-conviction incarceration occurs
long after an arrest, the court declined to categorize it as a seizure and to afford it
Fourth Amendment protection. See id. Rather, the court believed that the Fourth
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claims are covered by explicit Constitutional text is a person prohibited
117
from alleging a violation of his or her substantive due process rights.
Thus, the court reasoned, where a claim falls within the definition of a
seizure, it must be brought under the Fourth Amendment because this
provision specifically addresses such deprivations of liberty. 118 The court,
however, held that where the Constitution does not explicitly cover a malicious prosecution claim, such a claim may be based on a Constitutional
provision other than the Fourth Amendment. 119
Amendment was meant only to apply to pretrial deprivations of liberty. See id.
("[The] Framers of the Constitution drafted the Fourth Amendment to quell pretrial deprivations of liberty."). The court adopted this view despite Justice Ginsburg's opinion in Albright, stating that certain restrictions on a person's liberty
occurring post-trial might amount to a seizure. See id.; Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d
1159, 1163 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply Fourth Amendment beyond pretrial
deprivations of liberty), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 631 (1997); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85
F.3d 1480, 1490 (l1th Cir. 1996) (finding that mistreatment of pretrial detainee
falls under Fourteenth Amendment); Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 456
(5th Cir. 1994) (noting that text of Fourth Amendment does not support its application to events after arrest); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192-93 (7th Cir. 1989)
(concluding that constitutionality of pretrial detention falls under Fourteenth
Amendment rather than Fourth Amendment). The court went on to say that even
those courts that have extended the concept of seizure to apply to the period a
defendant is kept with his or her arresting officer do not hold that a post-conviction incarceration amounts to a seizure. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 174; see also Gonzalez v. Entress, 133 F.3d 551, 554 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[I]t seriously misunderstands the
Fourth Amendment to treat a conviction based on improperly obtained evidence
as an independent violation of the Fourth Amendment. The conviction is not an
unreasonable search and seizure."); Pierce v. Multnomah County, 76 F.3d 1032,
1043 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Fourth Amendment sets the applicable constitutional limitations on the treatment of an arrestee detained without a warrant up until the
time such arrestee is released or found to be legally in custody . . ").
In addition, the court did not interpret Albright to mean that a plaintiff must
allege a violation of his or her Fourth Amendment rights in order to satisfy a
§ 1983 claim for malicious prosecution. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 172.
117. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 172 (noting that "Albright commands that claims
governed by explicit constitutional text may not be grounded in substantive due
process."). SeniorJudge Debevoise, dissenting, however, pointed out that a majority of the courts of appeals have held otherwise, interpreting Albright to require
§ 1983 malicious prosecution claims to be predicated upon the Fourth Amendment. See id. at 181 (Debevoise, J., dissenting) (stating that majority of circuit
courts, including Second, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits,
conclude that "constitutional malicious prosecution claims remain viable after Albright although based upon violations of the Fourth Amendment"). For a further
discussion of appellate courts finding plaintiffs must allege a violation of Fourth
Amendment rights, see supra note 85 and accompanying text.
118. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 172 (interpreting Albright to mean that where
plaintiff brings § 1983 action for malicious prosecution alleging deprivation of pretrial liberty, plaintiff must also allege violation of Fourth Amendment rights).
119. See id. (interpreting Albright to represent "broader proposition that a section 1983 claim may be based on a constitutional provision other than the Fourth
Amendment" such as procedural due process or other explicit text of Constitution). It is only where the constitution provides explicitly for an alleged violation
that a plaintiff may not base his or her complaint upon substantive due process.
See id.
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Because the Third Circuit did not find that a post-conviction incarceration, such as Torres asserted, fell within the definition of a seizure, and
because the district court had dismissed plaintiffs First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims, it reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case to the district court to enter summary judgment in favor
120
of McLaughlin.
3.

Facts of Gallo v. City of Philadelphia

The only other Third Circuit case that has seriously attempted to apply the Albright analysis is Gallo v. City of Philadelphia.1 21 In Gallo, the owner
of a cabinet business, was charged with arson. 122 Following an indictment,
Gallo was required to post a $10,000 bond, was restricted from leaving
NewJersey, was required to attend all court hearings and was instructed to
contact Pretrial Services weekly. 123 Upon discovering, however, that the
fire marshal altered his original report from electrical appliance to incendiary and added to the text that he believed someone had deliberately
wrapped a cloth around the iron, thus suggesting arson, the jury acquitted
120. See id. at 175 (holding plaintiffs post-conviction incarceration did not
rise to seizure, thus, reversing order of district court and remanding case to district
court). The court, upon remanding the case to the district court, directed that
summary judgment be entered in favor of the two officers, McLaughlin and Sunderhauf. See id.
121. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998) (noting
that this was court's "first occasion to consider Albright's holding that section 1983
malicious prosecution claims must show more than a substantive due process violation"). Even though the court has addressed two post AIbright malicious prosecution claims, it has not had occasion to consider the relevant issue in Albright. See
Montgomery v. De Simone, 159 F.3d 120, 124 (3d Cir. 1998) (considering only
whether plaintiff must demonstrate absence of probable cause to establish malicious prosecution claim); Hilfirty v. Shipman, 91 F.3d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1996) (addressing only issue of whether nolle prosequi satisfies common law element of
malicious prosecution that proceeding end in plaintiff's favor).
122. See Gallo, 161 F.3d at 219-20 (explaining former charge against plaintiff
that, having ended in his favor, led plaintiff to bring claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983). Gallo was charged with setting fire to his cabinet shop located
in Philadelphia. See id. at 219 (stating that fire broke out on June 11, 1989). The
fire marshal, dispatched to determine the cause of the fire, stated in his report that
the fire had started when a hand iron ignited a cloth. See id. After the fire, Gallo
filed a claim with his insurance company. See id. The insurance company's two
investigators spoke to Pelszynski, whereupon they filed a revised report as to the
fire's cause, stating this time that the fire was due to incendiary because someone
deliberately placed a cloth around a heated iron. See id. Upon filing this revised
report, the fire marshal gave the case to the joint Philadelphia-Federal arson task
force, whereupon Thomas Rooney and William Campbell, as agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms, filed a report stating that the fire was due to
incendiary, making no mention of the fire marshal's original report. See id. Based
on this report, a federal grand jury indicted Gallo. See id. (stating "Gallo [was
indicted] on two counts of mail fraud, one count of malicious destruction of a
building by fire, and one count of making false statements to obtain a loan").
123. See id. (stating restrictions on plaintiffs pretrial liberties). Although
Gallo was never arrested, detained or handcuffed, his restrictions remained in effect until his trial in March of 1995. See id.
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Gallo. 124 Following dismissal of the charges, Gallo brought an action for
malicious prosecution under § 1983, alleging that the municipal fire marshal altered his views on the fire's cause because of pressure from Gallo's
125

insurance company.

The District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that
Gallo must assert a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights; however,
the court ruled that the restrictions on Gallo's post-indictment liberty,
(i.e., the requirement that he post bond, the prohibition against his leaving NewJersey, the requirement that he attend all court hearings and that
he contact Pretrial Services on a weekly basis) did not amount to Fourth
Amendment seizures.

12 6

Conversely, the Third Circuit, relying on Justice Ginsburg's analysis,
found that the restrictions on Gallo's post-indictment liberty amounted to
a Fourth Amendment seizure. 127 In addition, the court interpreted Albright to mean that one must allege more than the common law elements
for malicious prosecution to assert a claim under § 1983 and, specifically,
124. See id. at 219-20. It was not until two months before Gallo's trial that he

learned of the fire marshal's original report. See id. at 219. The fire marshal, however, denied the existence of an original report. See id. at 219-20. The jury, however, believing the evidence, acquitted Gallo of the charges of arson. See id. at 220
(believing report had been altered). For a further discussion of the discrepancy
between the fire marshal's original report and the report submitted at trial, see
supra note 122 and accompanying text.
125. See id. at 220. Following acquittal of his charges, Gallo filed two suits,
one claiming that the City of Philadelphia, Pelszynski, Kufta and Risso, among
others, had instigated a federal prosecution against him without probable cause
and the other, a Bivens action, claiming that Rooney and Campbell had violated his
constitutional rights when they failed to admit the existence of the original report.
See id. Because both suits alleged violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights, the
district court combined the two actions. See id. (consolidating Bivens action and
claim for § 1983 malicious prosecution violation).
126. See id. Upon plaintiff having asserted his § 1983 malicious prosecution
claim, Rooney and Campbell both filed motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity and contending that they were not required to have turned over the original report sooner than they had. See id. (filing motion to dismiss and asserting that
failure to deliver exculpatory material in more timely manner is not violative of
Constitution). The district court granted both of these motions because it determined that Gallo's pretrial restrictions did not amount to seizures under the
Fourth Amendment. See id. (interpreting Aibright to require plaintiff allege violation of Fourth Amendment in order to satisfy § 1983 malicious prosecution claim).
The court did not, however, rule on whether Gallo had met the common law elements for the tort of malicious prosecution or whether the federal agents were
entitled to qualified immunity. See id. (refusing to consider issue because that
Gallo's allegations did not amount to seizure).
127. See id. at 222 (finding pretrial liberties of posting bond, restrictions on
travel and contact with weekly service amounted to seizure within meaning of
Fourth Amendment). The Gallo court relied on Justice Ginsburg's analysis of
seizure, stating that even though one incarcerated pending trial suffers greater
restraints on liberty than one released on bail, only the latter remains seized. See
id. at 223.
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that the plaintiff must show a deprivation of liberty consistent with the
128
notion of seizure.
C.

The Current State of the Law in the Third Circuit

With respect to § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution, the Albright
decision has narrowed the Third Circuit's formerly expansive view. 129 Today, the Third Circuit takes the position that claims for malicious prosecution under § 1983 must allege more than just the common law elements of
malicious prosecution.18 0
Whether the Third Circuit requires that claims for malicious prosecu13 1
tion be brought under the Fourth Amendment, however, is not clear.
In Gallo, the court stated that "a plaintiff asserting a malicious prosecution
claim must show 'some deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept
of "seizure."' 1,,82In Torres, however, the court stated that a plaintiff could
bring a cause of action for a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under a
provision other than the Fourth Amendment, such as procedural due process. 188 In this court's view, the Albright decision merely established that
where the Constitution explicitly provides protection, a plaintiff cannot
bring a cause of action under the more loosely defined concept of substantive due process.18 4 Thus, because the court in Gallo determined that the
restrictions on plaintiff's pretrial liberties (i.e., the requirements that he
post bond, that he attend all court hearings and that he keep in contact
with Pretrial Services) amounted to a seizure, a violation that is specifically
128. See id. at 223-24 (finding common law elements of malicious prosecution
alone do not satisfy § 1983 claim). The court stated that simply proving prosecution without probable cause states only an action for the common law tort of malicious prosecution. See id. at 222 ("Albright implies that prosecution without
probable cause is not, in and of itself, a constitutional tort."). Rather, § 1983 is
intended to rectify violations of constitutional magnitude. See id. (finding deprivation of liberty consistent with notion of seizure to satisfy constitutional violation
requirement). For a further discussion of why some courts find a constitutional
violation contained within the common law elements of malicious prosecution, see
supra note 17 and accompanying text.
129. For a further discussion of why the Third Circuit has narrowed its formerly expansive view, see supra note 128 and accompanying text.
130. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit's requirements for malicious prosecution, see supra note 115 and accompanying text.
131. For a further discussion of whether the Third Circuit allows § 1983 malicious prosecution claims to be predicated upon sections other than the Fourth
Amendment, see infra notes 132-41 and accompanying text.
132. See Gallo, 161 F.3d at 222 (quoting Singer v. Fulton County Sheriff, 63 F.3d
110, 116 (2d Cir. 1995)). For a further discussion of this issue, see infra notes 13139 and accompanying text.
133. See Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating "a
section 1983 claim may be based on a constitutional provision other than the
Fourth Amendment" and that "Albright commands that claims governed by explicit
constitutional text may not be grounded in substantive due process").
134. For a further discussion on the limitations to substantive due process
claims, see supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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provided for by the Fourth Amendment, then presumably both the Torres
court and the Galo court would agree that based on these facts the plaintiff had to bring his § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution under the
Fourth Amendment.1 3 5 Gallo never stated that a plaintiff must allege a
violation of the Fourth Amendment, it merely acknowledged that because
the plaintiff was alleging facts that amounted to a seizure, the court should
analyze his § 1983 malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth
36
Amendment.'
Thus, it is possible that these two holdings are consistent.1 3 7 The
Torres court said that other courts may be requiring that plaintiffs allege a
violation of their Fourth Amendment rights only because those cases' factual situations involved only pretrial deprivations of liberty.' 3 8 Because
the Fourth Amendment covers pretrial deprivations of liberty, then consistent with Albright, these courts should require the action to be brought
under the Fourth Amendment. 13 9 When the allegation, however, does
not fall within the purview of the Fourth Amendment (i.e., does not constitute seizure), the Tor-es court reads Albright as allowing a § 1983 action for
malicious prosecution under another constitutional provision. 140 Thus, it
is possible that the Third Circuit simply views Gallo as factually distinct,
requiring only that plaintiffs who allege violations consistent with those
asserted by the plaintiff in Galloallege violations under the Fourth Amend135. See Torres, 163 F.3d at 172. The court stated:
[T]o the extent that other courts of appeal seem to hold that Albright
requires a Fourth Amendment violation as a basis for a section 1983 malicious prosecution claim, we note that those cases are factually distinct
from Torres's. Albright and the subsequent courts of appeal cases that
rely on the Fourth Amendment involved pre-trialdeprivations of liberty.
Torres's claims, however, arises from post-conviction incarceration.
Id. (emphasis in original).
136. For a further discussion of the holding in Gallo, see supra notes 126-28
and accompanying text.
137. For a further discussion of why the Gallo and Torres decisions may be
consistent, see supra notes 129-34 and accompanying text.
138. See Tor-es, 163 F.3d at 172 (stating that to extent other court of appeals
have required allegation of Fourth Amendment violation, "[those] cases .

.

. in-

volved pre-trial deprivations of liberty. Torres's claim, however, arises from postconviction incarceration").

139. See id. (requiring plaintiffs bringing § 1983 claims for malicious prosecution to allege violations of constitutional provision that provide explicitly for such
violations).
140. See id. (distinguishing Albright factually). Justice Rehnquist explained
that in Albright, plaintiffs claim was a very limited one that did not raise a procedural due process argument. See id. Thus, because Aibright did not assert a violation of any other constitutional amendments, the Torres court did not interpret
Aibright as limiting § 1983 malicious prosecution claims to violations of the Fourth
Amendment. See id. at 173 (finding "section 1983 malicious prosecution claim may
also include police conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment, the procedural
due process clause or other explicit text of the Constitution"). For a further discussion of why the court takes an expansive view of § 1983 malicious prosecution
actions, see supra notes 131-36 and accompanying text.
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ment, while plaintiffs claiming different types of violations may still allege
141
violations under other constitutional provisions.
One thing that is relatively certain from the Torres decision, however,
is that the Third Circuit does not view post-conviction incarcerations as
amounting to seizures. 142 On the other hand, the Gallo decision seems to
stand for the proposition that certain pretrial deprivations of liberty, such
as the requirement that plaintiff post bond, the restrictions on his or her
travel or the requirement that plaintiff attend court hearings, will amount
43
to a Fourth Amendment seizure.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

Because of the Supreme Court's decision in Albright, it is now clear
that plaintiffs alleging a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution in the
Third Circuit must demonstrate some violation of constitutional magnitude. 144 Just what amounts to "constitutional magnitude," however, is not
entirely certain. 145 It is possible that the Torres decision and the decision
in Gallo are consistent with one another, both allowing claims for malicious prosecution under § 1983 to be brought under other constitutional
provisions, but only where the facts alleged do not amount to Fourth
1 47
Amendment seizures. 146 It is clear that the Torres court takes this view.
On the other hand, Gallo may have stopped short of interpreting Albright,
as many other circuit courts have, to mean that § 1983 malicious prosecution claims may only be predicated upon Fourth Amendment viola141. For a further discussion of how Gallo is factually distinct, see supranotes
117-19 and accompanying text.
142. For a further discussion of why the court rejected post-conviction incarceration as seizure, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
143. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 225 (3d Cir. 1998). On
the other hand, there may even be a split within the Third Circuit regarding the

pretrial deprivations in Gallo that were determined to constitute a seizure. See
Torres, 163 F.3d at 176 (Debevoise, J., dissenting) (alluding to fact that plaintiff in

Torres suffered similar pretrial deprivations, although court refused to label them
as seizure). The plaintiff in Torres, like the plaintiff in Galo, also suffered pretrial
deprivations, such as the fact that he was released only upon bond. See id. at 179
(citing Gallo, 161 F.3d at 222) (Debevoise, J., dissenting) (stating that "It]he recent
decision of another panel of this Court agrees with Justice Ginsburg's concurring
opinion in Aibright and holds that restrictions such as those imposed upon Torres
in this case amount to a seizure"). Thus, because the court in Torres refused to
acknowledge these similar pretrial deprivations as seizures, the possibility of a split

in the Third Circuit remains. See id. (Debevoise, J., dissenting).
144. For a further discussion of why the Third Circuit now requires § 1983
malicious prosecution claims to allege a violation of constitutional dimension after
Albright, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
145. For a further discussion of the possible split within Third Circuit, see
supra notes 129-143 and accompanying text.
146. For a further discussion of the possible consistency within the Third Circuit, see supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
147. For a further discussion of the decision in Torres, see supra note 140 and

accompanying text.
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tions. 148 Because there have only been two decisions in the Third Circuit
that have addressed this issue, it remains to be seen how the court will
decide this possible split. 149 Although plaintiffs must wait for the courts
definitively to resolve this issue-Gallo,like Albright, having "muddied the
waters" for practioners in the Third Circuit-plaintiffs' best bet is to bring
a § 1983 malicious prosecution action under the Fourth Amendment and
to attempt to allege violations that amount to deprivations of pretrial
liberties.
Mary E. Williams

148. For a further discussion of possible split, see supra notes 129-143 and
accompanying text.
149. For a further discussion of how the Third Circuit has only considered
these issues on two occasions, see supra note 121 and accompanying text.
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